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Vulnerability of machine learning methods to adversarial attack: Traditional deep learning methods are known to be vulnerable to attacks where a small perturbation of the input (e.g., an image) that is **imperceptible** to a human observer can cause a trained classifier to fail.

**Original (PGD) adversarial training method:** PGD<sup>2</sup> trains the loss  $\mathcal{L}_{\theta}$ by perturbing training samples zwithin a metric-space ball of size  $\epsilon$ to create adversarial samples  $\tilde{z}$  that are then used in training:

$$\inf_{\theta} E_{P_n} \left[ \sup_{\tilde{z}: d(z,\tilde{z}) \leq \epsilon} \mathcal{L}_{\theta}(\tilde{z}) \right],$$

where  $P_n$  denotes the empirical distribution of the training samples.

**PGD** is an example of distributionally robust optimization (DRO): In DRO the empirical distribution is replaced by the worst-case adversarial distribution Q in some model neighborhood  $\mathcal{U}(P_n)$  around  $P_n$ :

$$\inf_{\theta} \sup_{Q \in \mathcal{U}(P_n)} E_Q[\mathcal{L}_{\theta}].$$

**Robustness is increased by training** for the worst case.

When using adversarial training, the choice of model neighborhood is important for performance!



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# **Adversarially Robust Learning** with Optimal-Transport Regularized Divergences

**ARMOR**<sub>D</sub> Method<sup>1</sup>: Our DRO-based approach improves model robustness by both adversarially transporting (via an optimal transport cost) and adversarially re-weighting (via an information divergence) samples during training.

ARMOR<sub>D</sub> can be combined with other popular methods, e.g., that modify the training loss, such as PGD<sup>2</sup>, TRADES<sup>3</sup>, MART<sup>4</sup>, and UDR<sup>5</sup> to yield improved performance when under adversarial attack:

	CIFAR10 Performance		
Defense	AutoAttack	<b>PGD</b> <sup>200</sup>	Nat.
PGD	42.5%	46.0%	86.40%
UDR-PGD	48.47%	52.95%	81.71%
$ARMOR_{\alpha}$ - $UDR$ - $PGD$	48.63%	53.62%	80.29%
TRADES	49.1%	51.9%	80.8%
UDR-TRADES	49.9%	53.6%	84.4%
$ARMOR_{\alpha}$ - $TRADES$	51.4%	53.74%	80.76%
MART	48.2%	53.3%	81.9%
UDR-MART	49.1%	54.1%	80.1%
$ARMOR_{\alpha}$ - $MART$	50.6%	56.22%	81.03%

### **Optimal-Transport Regularized Divergences:**

- and C as follows

where

Our work generalizes the optimal-transport DRO results of [6], [7], and is related to the DRO method [8].

**References:** [1] J. Birrell, M. Ebrahimi, arXiv:2309.03791, 2023

- ICLR, 2020
- ICLR, 2022

 $D^{c}(\nu \| \mu) \coloneqq \inf_{\eta \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{Z})} \{ D(\eta \| \mu) + C(\eta, \nu) \}$ 

C is an **optimal transport cost** for a cost function c,  $C(\mu, \nu) \coloneqq \inf_{\pi:\pi_1 = \mu, \pi_2 = \nu} \int c(z, \tilde{z}) \pi(dz d\tilde{z})$ 

*D* is an **information divergence**, e.g., an *f*-divergence,  $D_f(\mu \| \nu) = E_{\nu}[f(d\mu/d\nu)].$ 

**Properties (under appropriate assumptions):** • Divergence property:  $D^{c}(\nu \| \mu) \geq 0$  and  $D^{c}(\nu \| \mu) = 0$ if and only if  $\nu = \mu$ . This implies  $D^c(\nu \| \mu)$  quantifies the discrepancy between  $\nu$  and  $\mu$ .

• **Optimizer:** there **exists a unique optimizer**,  $\eta_*$ , with

 $D^{c}(\nu \| \mu) = D(\eta_{*} \| \mu) + C(\eta_{*}, \nu)$ 

• DRO neighborhoods: The DRO neighborhoods  $\{Q: D^c(Q||P_n) \le \epsilon\}$  are closed convex sets.

• Interpolation property:  $D^c$  interpolates between D

 $\lim_{r \to 0^+} r^{-1} D^{rc}(\nu \| \mu) = C(\mu, \nu), \quad \lim_{r \to \infty} D^{rc}(\nu \| \mu) = D(\nu \| \mu)$ 

**Computationally-Tractable Dual-Formulation of** Adversarially-Robust Training Problem: We use the  $D^c$ -DRO neighborhoods to obtain a novel adversarial training method and, via convex duality, obtain the **computationally tractable form**  $\inf_{\theta \in \Theta} \sup_{Q: D_f^c(Q \| P_n) \le \epsilon} E_Q[\mathcal{L}_\theta]$ 

 $= \inf_{\lambda > 0, \rho \in \mathbb{R}, \theta \in \Theta} \left\{ \epsilon \lambda + \rho + \lambda E_{P_n} \left[ f^* (\lambda^{-1} (\mathcal{L}^c_{\theta, \lambda}(z_i) - \rho)) \right] \right\}$ 

 $\mathcal{L}^{c}_{\theta,\lambda}(z) \coloneqq \sup_{\tilde{z} \in \mathcal{Z}} \{ \mathcal{L}_{\theta}(\tilde{z}) - \lambda c(z, \tilde{z}) \} \,.$ 

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